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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
JULLYN DOYLE, 
Defendant/Appellant 
Case No. 20090148-CA 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
ARGUMENT 
I. BECAUSE CUENCA WAS A MATERIAL WITNESS, MAKING HER 
CREDIBILITY VITAL, THE STATE'S USE OF HER FALSE 
TESTIMONY CREATED A REASONBLE LIKELIHOOD THAT THE 
JUDGMENT OF THE JURY WAS AFFECTED 
The State erroneously claims that this Court need not decide whether the 
prosecutor knowingly used [or relied on] false testimony because Defendant is not 
entitled to relief where she fails to establish the requisite prejudice. See, Appellee Br. at 
14. While the State concedes that a '"conviction procured by the knowing use of false 
testimony is fundamentally unfair[,]'" it qualifies any remedy on whether such testimony 
"'could have affected the judgment of the jury.'" Appellee Br. at 14 (quoting State v. 
Hewitt, 689 P.2d 22, 24 (Utah 1984) and State v. Gordon, 8$6 P.2d 112, 115-16 (Utah Ct 
App 1994)). Although true, Doyle need only to show that there is "any reasonable 
1 
likelihood" that the false statement could have affected the jury. State v. Gordon, 886 
P.2d 112, 116 (Utah Ct. App 1994). 
As Doyle pointed out in her brief, "[W]hen a prosecutor is aware that testimony is 
false, he or she has a duty to correct the false impression; failure to do so requires 
reversal' if there is any reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have affected 
the judgment of the jury.'" Appllant Br. at 16. State v. Gordon, 886 P.2d 112, 116 (Utah 
Ct. App 1994) (quoting Walker v. State, 624 P.2d 687, 690 (Utah 1981) (emphasis 
added)). Notably, this Court has added that "[t]his applies even if the prosecutor 
unwittingly introduced the false testimony...." Gordon, 886 P.2d, at 116. This case 
presents such a scenario. 
Here, there appears to be no dispute that Cuenca's statements were false and the 
prosecutors knew, or at least should have known, that those statements were false. The 
State, however, claims that this Court need not decide whether the prosecutors failed to 
correct this false testimony because Defendant "fails to establish the requisite prejudice." 
Appellee Br. at 14. Defendant asserts that the nature and circumstance surrounding 
Cuenca's testimony dictate that there was indeed a "reasonable likelihood that the false 
testimony could have affected the judgment of the jury." Gordon, 886 P.2d, at 116. 
a. The Nature and Circumstances of Cuenca's Testimony Dictates that 
her False Statements Could Have Reasonably Affected the Judgment 
of the Jury 
It's undisputed that the State elicited and, by not correcting it, relied on a false 
statement of a material witness - Cuenca. The State is apparently claiming a no harm, no 
foul scenario in stating that "because the record demonstrates that Cuenca's plea-related 
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statements were fully explained, evaluated, and argued by the parties during the trial, 
alleviating any possible prejudice that may have otherwise arisen...[.]" Appellant Br. at 
15. The record shows, however, that Cuenca's credibility was crucial evidence; that the 
State never mitigated or corrected the false testimony; and that it was Doyle that was 
forced by the State's inaction to correct the false statement through impeachment. 
Therefore, under these circumstances, a reasonable likelihood existed that Cuenca's false 
statements could have affected the judgment of the jury. Gordon, 886 P.2d, at 116. 
Cuenca, the only eyewitness and thus a momentous witness, made trial statements 
the prosecutors knew, or at least should have known, to have been false certainly creates 
a "reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have affected the judgment of the 
jury." Gordon, 886 P.2d, at 116. The basis for which the jury's judgment could have 
been reasonably affected is grounded in the prosecutor's failure to comply with their 
affirmative duty to correct false testimony. This failure permitted the jury to hear and 
consider false information that would have otherwise impeached Cuenca's motive to 
testify as she did. 
The State believes that no harm resulted from the prosecutor's failure to correct 
false testimony because defense counsel took the initiative to call Cuenca's attorney, 
Gunda Jarvis, to testify regarding the plea deal and introduced both written plea 
agreements from Cuenca's criminal cases. Appellee Br. at 16-17. The fact remains, 
however, that the prosecutors still failed to correct Cuenca's false testimony - testimony 
that goes directly to motive to lie about Doyle's involvement. 
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In her Brief, Doyle addressed the circumstances which show how critical Cuenca's 
testimony was at trial - this criticality goes to show that her false testimony could create a 
reasonable likelihood of affecting the jury's assessment of the evidence. 
Considering the prosecution's theory that Doyle constructively possessed the 
contraband (R. 341, Jury Instruction #9), Cuenca's testimony that Doyle did in fact 
possess the contraband makes Cuenca's testimony crucial. As such, it becomes 
imperative that Doyle have the opportunity to present to the jury any motive Cuenca 
would have to lie; to wit: plea agreements with the State in exchange for testimony 
against Doyle. 
In Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 92 S.Ct. 763, 31 L.Ed.2d 104 (1972), the 
United States Supreme Court addressed the gravity of prosecutors failing to correct false 
evidence, even when unsolicited. In Giglio, the defendant appealed his conviction of 
passing forged money orders, arguing that the prosecution failed to disclose its promise to 
Mr. Taliento, the government's key witness, that he would not be prosecuted if he 
testified for the government. Giglio, 405 U.S. at 150-51. 
Relying on its analysis of basic principles of due process, the Court reiterated that 
it had been "made clear that that deliberate deception of a court and jurors by the 
presentation of known false evidence is incompatible with rudimentary demands of 
justice." Giglio, 405 U.S. at 153 (internal quotations omitted). It further added that such 
is the case even "when the State, although not soliciting false evidence, allows it to go 
uncorrected when it appears." Id. (citing Naupe v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 79 S.Ct. 1173, 
4 
3 L.Ed.2d 1217 (1959) (holding that the false testimony usfed by the State in securing the 
conviction of petitioner may have had an effect on the outcome of the trial.)). 
In Giglio, the circumstances were such that the Court had to consider the evidence 
presented to the jury, specifically the credibility of the key witness in light of the 
existence of a possible plea deal in exchange for testimony. The Court stated that 
"[w]hen the 'reliability of a given witness may well be determinative of guilt or 
innocence,' nondisclosure of evidence affecting credibility falls within this general rule." 
Giglio, 405 U.S., at 154 (citing Naupe, 360 U.S., at 269), Considering the gravity of 
false testimony - regarding a plea agreement - gone uncorrected, the Court held that the 
government's failure to produce the information of a plea arrangement to the defense and 
the critical nature of the key witness's testimony was grounds, under due process 
requirements, for a new trial. Giglio, 405 U.S., at 154-55. 
Similarly, the government's prosecutors failed to correct false testimony and did 
not provide defense counsel with crucial plea agreements. Here, the fact that the jury 
was led to believe, by the prosecutor's failure to correct testimony, that Cuenca did not 
have a motive to lie (because the jury was unaware of any plea agreements) certainly 
created the likelihood that the jury would use Cuenca's testimony, in light of all the 
evidence, to convict Doyle. Like in Giglio and Naupe, "[w]hen the 'reliability of a given 
witness may well be determinative of guilt or innocence,' nondisclosure of evidence 
affecting credibility falls within this general rule." Giglio, 405 U.S., at 154 (citing 
Naupe, 360 U.S., at 269). 
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b. Regardless of Any Possible Harm, the Fact Remains that the 
Prosecutors Failed to Do Their Duty and Correct the False Testimony 
Aside from the possible harm done through Cuenca's false testimony, the 
prosecutors still failed to comply with their duty to correct false testimony.l While the 
State's Brief focuses on the effect of the harm (whether it could have affected the jury's 
judgment), it fails to address the underlying issue: that the prosecutors still failed to 
comply with their duty to correct false testimony. 
Two critical facts present themselves here: (1) it was defense counsel that 
affirmatively tried to correct Cuenca's false statements - not the prosecutors; and (2) the 
prosecutors did not address this issue until closing arguments, which is insufficient. 
First, the State's prosecutors failed to correct Cuenca's false statements. "As the 
State's representative, the prosecutor has a duty to 'see that justice is done.'" State v. 
Gordon, 886 P.2d 112, 115 (Utah Ct. App 1994) (quoting State v. Walker, 624 P.2d 687, 
691 (Utah 1981)). Accordingly, it is the prosecutor's duty to correct false statements. Id. 
at 116. That did not occur in this case. 
The State acknowledges that Cuenca testified, on dired examination by the State 
and cross-examination by defense counsel, that she had not been given a plea deal in 
exchange for her testimony. See, Appellant Br. at 15-16. The State further concedes that 
it was defense counsel that called Cuenca's attorney to testify regarding the plea deal, and 
that it was defense counsel that introduced the plea agreements into evidence. See, 
1
 Regardless of this Court's findings as to whether there was a reasonable likelihood of 
the false testimony affecting the jury's judgment, Doyle asks this Court to admonish the 
prosecutors in failing to comply with their duty to correct Cuenca's duty. 
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Appellant's Br. at 16. The only action taken by the prosecutors that could have 
comported with their duty to correct the false statement was that they acknowledged the 
plea deal. See, Appellant's Br. at 16. That action, however, occurred during closing 
arguments. 
Second, any attempt by the prosecutors to correct the false testimony did not occur 
until closing argument. Specifically, the prosecution closed with: 
Now, defense counsel had pointed out a little pit of problem with Ms. 
Cuenca's testimony. She's pointed out that she testified that she didn't get 
a deal in this case. We've shown that that's not true. Defense counsel 
showed that that's not true. She did get a deal in this case. We stipulated 
to the deals that she did get in this case. 
(R. 473: 388). The prosecutors admittedly did nothing more than concur with the 
evidence that Cuenca lied, but only did so after defense counsel brought the false 
testimony to light. The fact that defense counsel was forced to reveal the truth is 
axiomatic; however, to give the prosecutors credit for complying with their duty under 
these facts, if it is compliance at all, creates an exception that swallows the rule; it 
enables prosecutors to remain non-compliant and benefit from false testimony until called 
out. That result would be antithetical of the role that prosecutors play in our justice 
system, which is to see "see that justice is done." State v. Gordon, 886 P.2d 112, 115 
(Utah Ct. App 1994) (internal quotation omitted). 
II. THE TRIAL COURT'S 404(B) ANALYSIS WAS INSUFFICIENT TO 
THE POINT THAT ITS RULING WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION 
When analyzing admissibility of bad-acts evidence, a trial court must determine: 
(1) whether evidence is being offered for a proper, non-character purpose; (2) whether 
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such evidence is relevant; and (3) whether evidence must be excluded as more prejudicial 
than probative. Utah R. Evid. 402, 403 and 404(b); see also, State v. Rees, 2004 UT App 
51, t 2, 88 P.3d 359 (citing State v. Decorso, 1999 UT 57, t 20, 993 P.2d 837, cert 
denied, 528 U.S. 1164, 120 S.Ct. 1181 (2002)). Here, the trial court's perfunctory 404(b) 
analysis was insufficient to justify the admission of Doyle's prior bad acts and was 
therefore an abuse of discretion 
a. Evidence of Prior Drug Usage was Not Admitted for Anything But to 
Show Doyle's Bad Character or Propensity to Use Drugs 
The crux of a 404(b) analysis begins with whether the prior bad acts are being 
offered for a "proper, noncharacter purpose." State v. Allen, 2005 UT 11, *{ 17, 108 P.3d 
730; cf., Utah R. Evid. 404(b) ("Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not 
admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity 
therewith."). As the State has argued, "Bad acts evidence is admissible under this first 
prong so long as it is relevant to show something other than Defendant's bad character." 
Appellant's Br. at 19. Here, the trial court abused its discretion because the prior bad acts 
only tend to show Doyle's conformity therewith. 
Here, the State argues that the trial court's analysis under this first prong was 
sufficient. In denying Doyle's motion, the trial court found that the "State is seeking to 
introduce such evidence for non-character purposes - i.e., to show ownership or 
possession of the methamphetamine..., to establish that the items founds...are in fact 
drug paraphernalia..., and other non-character purposes." (R. 240-42). The State's 
rationale to justify this finding is that "[w]ith Defendant's possession, intent, and use of 
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the meth and paraphernalia at issue below, the State appropriately looked to Defendant's 
prior use of meth to help establish these elements." Appellant's Br. at 22. Ownership or 
possession, however, are insufficient grounds to permit prior bad acts under a 404(b) 
analysis. 
Although the types of non-character purposes are "not exhaustive[,]" the basis for 
allowing proof of prior drug possession or use to show present possession or use is 
indisputably propensity evidence. State v. Allen, 2005 UT 11, f 17. While 404(b) 
evidence may concurrently show the defendant's propensity to commit the imputed act, 
that evidence is not admissible, however, "if it is relevant solely to show a defendant's 
propensity to commit a crime." State v. Pacheco, 712 P.2d 192, 195 (Utah 1985); also, 
State v. Allen, 2005 UT 11,117. 
Here, the State argues that: 
Although [evidence of prior possession or use] would be inadmissible to 
establish her propensity to use meth, it was offered and admitted for the 
alternative noncharacter purpose of helping to establish the contested issue 
of whether she possessed, used or intended to use the meth and 
paraphernalia in this case. 
Appellant's Br. at 22. The State goes on to argue that approximately eighteen months 
before this case, Doyle had admitted to police that she used methamphetamines and 
tested positive, as well as having been charged with DUI for meth. Appellant's Br. at 23. 
Accordingly, the State concludes that "[t]ogether, the evidence suggest not only that 
Defendant had a drug habit, but an active meth habit..., and that her use of the drug was 
deliberate or intentional as opposed to mistaken or accidental." Appellant's Br. at 23. 
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The Merriam-Webster Dictionary defines "propensity" as "an often intense natural 
inclination or preference." Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary. 2010. Merriam-
Webster Online. Here, the trial court as well as the State's reasoning for admitting the 
evidence does not qualify as a non-character purpose. Doyle contends that the inference 
to be drawn from the trial court's and the State's reasoning is:2 it is a legitimate non-
character purpose to introduce past possession in order to prove present possession. That 
conclusion, however, goes directly against the purpose behind excluding prior bad acts. 
See, State v. Reed, 2000 UT 68, t 23, 8 P.3d 1025 ("persons can be convicted for acts 
committed and not because of general character or proclivity to commit bad acts"). 
Consequently, because the prior bad acts demonstrated only her propensity to possess or 
use drugs, the trial court abused it discretion. 
b. Evidence of Prior Drug Possession or Use was Irrelevant Because it 
Only Shows Doyle's Proclivity to Commit the Offense Alleged 
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any tendency to make the existence 
of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less 
probable than it would be without the evidence. Utah R. Evid. 401. The State claims that 
evidence of prior meth use "make it more probable that Defendant possessed, used, or 
intended to use the charged items." Appellant's Br. at 23. In reliance, the State cites 
2
 In its ruling, the trial court indicated that the prior bad acts were admissible for the non-
character purpose to show ownership or possession.. ."and other non-character purposes." 
This latter justification is conclusory. By providing no other justification for the 
admission of the evidence, the trial court's ruling was superficial and thus an abuse of 
discretion. 
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State v. Bisner, 2001 UT 99, 37 P.3d 1073, for the general proposition that prior bad acts 
are relevant and thus admissible evidence. Bisner, however, is distinguishable. 
In Bisner, the defendant was convicted of two, first-degree felonies: murder and 
aggravated robbery. Bisner, 2001 UT 99, j^ 1. At trial the State was permitted to 
introduce, over defendant's objection, evidence of a drug debt owed by Golub to Bisner. 
The Utah Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's admissiojti of the evidence, stating that 
the evidence "tended to prove the material fact of Bisner's motive by presenting the jury 
with a reason Bisner had to kill Golub." Id. at ^ 58. While Doyle does not contend the 
logic in Bisner, its holding is inapplicable here. 
In Bisner, the court allowed evidence of a drug debt to show motive or intent to 
kill, not that Bisner had motive or intent to sell more drugs. The Utah Supreme Court has 
held that "even if otherwise relevant as defined by rule 401, evidence is irrelevant and 
inadmissible under rule 402 if the evidence is material and relevant to prove only the 
defendant's proclivity to commit the crime charged." State v. Fedorowicz, 2002 UT 67, ^ j 
32, 52 P.3d 1194. The State argues that the prior bad acts are relevant because it "tended 
to make it more probable that Defendant possessed, used, or intended to use the charged 
items." Appellant's Br. at 23; R: 240-42 (trial court finding that evidence is relevant 
"because it tends to [show]...the possession or ownership of the drugs - more or less 
probable...."). 
Again, basis for admitting the prior bad acts plainly appears to be propensity 
evidence - attempting to show that because Doyle used or possessed methamphetamines 
in the past, it is more probable that she intended to use or possess the drug in this 
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instance. Consequently, because the evidence is "relevant to prove only the defendant's 
proclivity to commit the crime charged[,]" it was an abuse of discretion to find that the 
evidence was relevant. Fedorowicz, 2002 UT 67, f^ 32. 
c. The Trial Court Incorrectly Considered and Applied the Shickles 
Factors to Determine Unfair Prejudice 
Even if this Court were to find that the evidence was presented for a legitimate 
non-character purpose and was relevant, under the Shickles factors, this Court should find 
that the evidence was unfairly prejudicial. 
First, the State contends that the "need for the evidence is great inasmuch as 
Defendant's meth use is highly probative of the charged crime and essential to a case 
built largely on circumstantial evidence." Appellant's Br. at 26. In support, the State 
cites State v. Shaffer, 725 P.2d 1301 (Utah 1986) and State v. Taylor, 818 P.2d 561 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1991). Both cases are different from this, in that the basis for allowing the prior 
bad acts was to establish a "common plan of marijuana distribution^]" Taylor, 818 P.2d, 
at 570, and "motive and identity." Shaffer, 725 P.2d, at 1309. While Taylor and Shaffer 
deal with circumstantial evidence and the theory of constructive possession, the State's 
"need for the evidence" should be given little weight while considering all the Shickles 
factors. 
Undeniably, it is more difficult to prove that a person constructively possessed 
contraband than it would be under normal "possessory" circumstances - e.g., the item 
was found in the person's immediate physical possession. Doyle contends that because 
the State has chosen to proceed under a more difficult theory, it should not be granted 
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evidentiary leniency as suggested. Appellant's Br. at 26. Accordingly, little weight 
should be given to the "need of the evidence" factor in determining prejudice. 
Second, the State notes that Doyle does not suggest "that there is any better or 
more effective alternative proof regarding the likelihood that she constructively possessed 
the meth and paraphernalia." Appellant's Br. at 26. In considering the "efficacy of 
alternative proof," the prosecution had a key witness - Cuetica - who testified to Doyle's 
alleged possession and/or use of the drugs. Considering the strength of an eye witness 
seriously diminishes the need to use prior bad acts. 
Third, the State erroneously asserts that "[e]ven the mere fact that Defendant 
drove while under the influence of meth, without more, seems highly unlikely to inspire 
overmastering hostility." Appellant's Br. at 26 (internal quotations omitted). The fact 
that the present offense and the prior offenses are substantively similar - use of 
methamphetamines while driving - there is a greater likplihood that the jury would 
harbor feelings of hostility. 
In State v. Allen, the defendant appealed his jury conviction of aggravated murder, 
in part, on the basis that evidence of a lesser offense involving fraud was introduced 
under Utah Rules of Evidence, 404(b). Allen, 2005 UT 11, f 33. In its analysis, the 
court concluded that "is unlikely that Allen's involvement in fraudulent activities would 
have roused the jury to overmastering hostility, especially in light of the gravity of the 
offenses for which he was charged." Allen suggests that the disparity between the prior 
bad act and the present offense may determine whether a jury is aroused to overmastering 
hostility. In Allen, because the prior act was nearly insignificant compared to the alleged 
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crime - murder - the jury would not be as inclined to be emolionally charged and punish 
the defendant for his prior wrongs. 
Conversely, the disparity between Doyle's prior acts and present offense are 
nearly indistinguishable. Because the underlying facts in the prior and present acts were 
that Doyle possessed and/or used methamphetamines, a jury would be more inclined to 
punish her for any perceived, continual drug use; especially when the prior acts involved 
use of drugs while driving a vehicle on public roads. 
Last, the trial court's findings were conclusory and unsupported by findings 
sufficient to claim that the trial court properly considered the Shickles factors. In State v. 
Decorso, 1999 UT 57, f 18, 993 P.2d 837, the Utah Supreme Court stated that 
"admission of prior crimes evidence itself must be scrupulously examined by trial judges 
in the proper exercise of that discretion." See also, State v. Nelson-Waggoner, 2000 UT 
59, 6 P.3d 1120 (affirming that appellate courts review the record to determine whether 
the admission of other bad acts evidence was scrupulously examined by the trial judge in 
the proper exercise of that discretion.). The trial court fails in this respect. 
Here, the trial court's cursory analysis and conclusion states: "The Court notes 
that all the evidence the State will submit against the defendant is prejudicial, but Rule 
403 only excludes 'unfair prejudice.' The Court finds that the evidence is not unfairly 
prejudicial and is therefore proper." (R. 240-42). There is no indication that the trial 
court conducted a "scrupulous examination," as demanded by Decorso, of all of the 
factors when considering whether to permit 404(b) evidence. Thus, the trial court abused 
its discretion by admitting such evidence. Cf. State v. Pedersen, 2010 UT App 38, ^ 38, 
14 
227 P.3d 1264 (finding that the trial court "carefully and thoroughly assessed the 
necessary [Shickles] factors..."). 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
For the foregoing reasons,, Doyle respectfully requests that this Court vacate her 
conviction and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings on the 404(b) 
evidence and a new trial. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 2nd day of August, 2010. 
MicTiael S. Brown 
Counsel for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I delivered two (2) true and correct copies of the foregoing 
Brief of Appellant to the Appeals Division, Utah Attorney General, 160 East 300 South, 
Sixth Floor, P.O. Box 140854, Salt Lake City, UT 84114, this 2nd day of August, 2010. 
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Addendum - A 
Trial Court's Order on Defendant's Motion to Exclude Prior Bad Acts 
Evidence (R. 240-42) 
JEFFREY R. BUHMAN, No. 7041 
Utah County Attorney 
RYAN V. PETERS, No. 10683 
Deputy Utah County Attorney 
100 East Center Street, Suite 2100 
Provo, Utah 84606 
Telephone: (801) 851-8026 
IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
v. 
JULLYN DOYLE, 
Plaintiff, 
Defendant. 
ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
TO EXCLUDE PRIOR BAD ACTS 
EVIDENCE 
Case No. 071402824 
Judge Darold J. McDade 
This matter comes before the Court on the defendant's Motion in Limine to Exclude Prior 
Bad Acts. Having been fully briefed and argued before the Court, the Motion is ripe for decision. 
The State put the defendant on notice that it intends to introduce the following bad acts 
evidence under Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 404(b) at trial: 
1. A 2006 DUI conviction wherein the defendant was convicted of driving while 
under the influence of methamphetamine. 
2. Statements made by the defendant when she was arrested in 2006 for DUI to the 
effect that she had consumed methamphetamine. 
V 
:> 
2 
3. Toxicology report from the 2006 DUI arrest showing the presence of 
methamphetamine in the defendant's blood. 
4. Toxicology report from an August 2007 arrest for DUI, showing the presence of 
methamphetamine in the defendant's blood. 
The defendant moved to exclude such evidence claiming the evidence is improper under Rule 
404(b). 
"In deciding whether evidence of other crimes is admissible under rule 404(b), the trial 
court must determine (1) whether such evidence is being offered for a proper, non-character 
purpose under 404(b), (2) whether such evidence meets the requirements of rule 402, and (3) 
whether this evidence meets the requirements of rule 403." State v, Cox, 169 P.3d 806, 813 
(Utah Ct. App. 2007) (citations omitted). 
The Court denies the defendant's motion based upon the following: 
The State is not seeking to introduce the evidence of other bad acts to establish character 
that conforms with the actions alleged in the current case. Rather, the State is seeking to 
introduce such evidence for non-character purposes-i.e., to show ownership or possession of the 
methamphetamine found in this case, to establish that the items found with the drugs are in fact 
drug paraphernalia (as expressly allowed by statute), and other non-character purposes. 
The evidence proposed by the State is clearly relevant under Rule 402 because it tends to 
make the existence of a fact of consequence in this matter-the possession or ownership of the 
drugs-more or less probable than it would be without the evidence. See URCrP 401. 
Mi 
Finally, the probative value of the evidence outweighs any unfair prejudicial effect. The 
Court notes that all the evidence the State will submit against the defendant is prejudicial, but 
Rule 403 only excludes "unfair prejudice." The Court finds that the evidence is not unfairly 
prejudicial and is therefore proper. 
Therefore, the Court DENIES the defendant's motion to exclude the prior bad acts 
mentioned in this order and the State may introduce the same at trial. 
Dated this day: f^bru^h $**> 2*°$ -
BY THE COURT* 
Addendum - B 
Jury Instruction #9 (R. 341) 
INSTRUCTION NO. 9 
Possession of a controlled substance and /or drug paraphernalia can be actual or 
constructive. To find that the defendant had constructive possession of the controlled substance, 
it is necessary to prove that there was a sufficient connection between the defendant and the 
controlled substance to permit an inference that the accused had both the power and the intent to 
exercise dominion and control over the controlled substance. Whether a sufficient connection 
exists depends upon the facts and circumstances of the case. While no exhaustive checklist of 
factors govern in determining whether the connection in a particular case is sufficient, several of 
the following combined factors may be useful: 
1. Ownership or occupancy of the residence or vehicle where the controlled substance 
was found; 
2. Presence of a defendant at the time the controlled substance was found; 
3. Defendant's or other's proximity to the controlled substance; 
4. Defendant's or other's previous drug use; 
5. Incriminating statements or behavior; 
6. The presence of a controlled substance in a specific area where the defendant had 
control. 
A person who might know the whereabouts of a controlled substance and who might have 
access to it but who has no intent to obtain and use the drugs cannot be found to have possessed a 
controlled substance. Knowledge and ability, although required to convict, are not by themselves 
enough for a conviction. There must be facts which show that the person intended to use the 
drugs as his own. L 
